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Abstract
In order to create low-income housing opportunities and mitigate exclusionary zoning, in 1968 Congress mandated that muni-
cipalities receiving comprehensive planning funds must create a housing element. In tandem, many states mandated that municipal
housing elements must accommodate low-income housing needs. After examining empirical research for California, Florida,
Illinois, and Minnesota, this review found aspirational success because those states rewarded the municipal planning process. In
order to increase low-income housing, this review argues for state housing policy reform. Under US Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s revised fair housing rule, which requires an assessment of local data, states can no longer ignore the
exclusionary behavior of municipalities.
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Introduction
A housing element is a collection of planning techniques (e.g.,
density bonus, accessory dwellings, inclusionary housing, and
mixed use) that municipalities implement in order to satisfy
housing needs (Ohm, Merrill, and Schmidke 2000). In many
states, housing elements are required chapters within general
plans and the plan’s elements (e.g., land use, housing, and
circulation) communicate a municipality’s housing vision
(Baer 1997; Kelly 2009, 47). After considering local demand,
municipal housing elements should position local housing
inventory in relation to regional demand (Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968). Regarding low-income households,
many housing elements accommodate low-income housing
needs by designating sites, identifying subsidies, and adopting
intergovernmental programs that broaden participation (Bratt
2012; Briggs and Mayberry 2003). This collective attention to
housing should produce desirable housing for all economic
segments (Listokin 1976, 6; Pendall 2000, 126, 129). However,
empirical research indicates that low-income housing produc-
tion via housing elements is constrained for two reasons:
municipal barriers and unfunded mandates.
Fiscally, municipalities have reasons for barring the entry of
low-income housing. A low-income household, which limits
housing costs to less than 30 percent of its income, will require
a subsidy unless the household endures conditions of over-
crowding,1 filtering,2 or subfamilies (Steele 2001).3 In turn,
any low-income housing unit will require a consistent subsidy
for the unit’s effective period. If a municipality closes gaps in
low-income housing costs and experiences a subsequent loss of
revenue (e.g., tax-exempt units, lower household discretionary
income), then the municipality might increase taxes to prevent
municipal service deterioration. As theorized by Tiebout and
tested by others, when municipal residents face increasing
taxes and/or declining services, high-income and mobile resi-
dents may “vote with their feet” and relocate to communities
catering to their self-interest (Banzhaf and Walsh 2008; Basolo
1999a; Dawkins 2005; Fischel 1992; Tiebout 1956). In
California’s City of Palo Alto, for example, these residents
organized and repealed an approved sixty-unit low-income
housing project (Sheyner 2013). Due to reduced federal bud-
gets, contingent state grants, and high-income residents, muni-
cipalities enact exclusionary zoning policies (e.g., large lots,
limited multifamily housing, open space preservation) that
allows housing that produces high tax revenue, requires low
service needs, and reduces potential low-income households
(DeSantis 2002; Ihlanfeldt 2004; Mitchell 2004; Schmidt and
Paulsen 2009). Returning to Palo Alto, the site intended for
low-income units is now approved for sixteen market-rate
single-family homes (Lee 2016).
Regarding low-income housing policy, housing elements
are unfunded mandates that masquerade as supply-side strate-
gies. A supply-side strategy should increase the housing supply
to deflate existing housing prices or provide new units at
all prices (Galster 1997; Listokin 1976). Alternatively, a
demand-side strategy should increase low-income housing
consumption by directly raising household incomes through
vouchers or indirectly with compulsory education (Chevalier
et al. 2005; Landis and McClure 2010). The housing element is
a “quasi” supply-side strategy because it attends to low-income
housing needs, but federal or state agencies do not provide
consistent subsidies for planned low-income units, deficiencies
in household incomes, or increases in housing prices. There-
fore, a housing element may raise attention and comply with
state mandates but not produce low-income housing units.
In this review, I examine the efficacy of housing elements as
a low-income housing intervention. Unlike other housing plans
that enjoy federal subsidies (e.g., housing assistance, areawide
housing opportunity, and consolidated plans), state-mandated
housing elements are no longer tethered to federal revenue, but
signal a municipality’s attention to local low-income housing
(Baer 1986; Struyk and Khadduri 1980; Varady and Birdsall
1991). As planners we need to know whether housing elements
have an impact on actual housing production or whether they
are otherwise meaningless activities. Therefore, I ask: to what
extent have housing elements increased low-income housing
production? After examining the existing empirical research,
this study found aspirational success (i.e., attention to, planning
for) rather than low-income housing production (Connerly and
Muller 1993; Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann 2003; Hoch
2007; Lewis 2003, 2005; Ramsey-Musolf 2016). This aspira-
tion is due to state housing policy that does not evaluate sub-
sequent housing production or provide consistent subsidies, but
simply rewards the planning process.
In this review, I take two positions. First, I argue that until
researchers and analysts understand housing element efficacy,
then the delivery of low-income housing via housing elements
will continue to be uneven and the ability to reform state policy
will remain limited. Our current understanding of housing ele-
ments is based on partitioned knowledge because the existing
research focuses on individual states. This narrow focus illu-
minates an individual state’s efforts but does not permit
comprehensive knowledge of housing elements with regard
to low-income housing production. Scholars may caution
against applying a single evaluation metric to multistate efforts
due to nonequivalent planning tools, political processes, and
units of analysis (Graddy and Bostic 2010, i98). However,
scholars cannot determine whether California’s housing ele-
ment performance, for instance, is better or worse than the
housing element performances inFlorida, Illinois,Massachusetts,
NewJersey,Oregon,Pennsylvania, orWashingtondue to nonuni-
form processes and outcomes (Basolo and Scally 2008; Bratt
2012; Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach 1997; Meck, Retzlaff, and
Schwab 2003).
Second, I argue that housing elements, with stronger state
policy and enforcement, could increase low-income housing
production if the states evaluated the housing element and the
subsequent housing production. Of the fifty states in the United
States, twenty-seven states (or 54 percent) require municipal
comprehensive plans (Appendix Table A1). Of that group, fif-
teen states (or 56 percent) require a housing element.
Alternatively, forty states (80 percent) require comprehensive
plans as a condition for adopting zoning or maintaining a
planning commission, and of that group, twenty-two states
(55 percent) require housing elements. Considering the
research of May and Burby (1996), if states provide planning
assistance that enhances municipal planning capacity and
adopt penalties based on housing production, then state policy
incentivizes municipalities (via the housing element) to pro-
vide equal opportunities for low-income and market-rate
housing production.
Recently, the US Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) revised its rule regarding the agency’s imple-
mentation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and now requires its
program participants4 to complete an assessment of fair hous-
ing (AFH; Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing [AFFH]
2015). The AFH may address municipal land use and zoning
(“local knowledge”) that increase segregation and impede a
low-income household’s access to housing opportunities
(AFFH Rule Guidebook 2015, 49–50, 200). The AFH may
suggest land use and zoning reforms as “meaningful actions”
within a “strategic plan” to reduce the impact of any factor that
restricts fair housing choice (pp. 311, 316–17). As a caveat,
HUD does not mandate AFH content but only accepts or rejects
the AFH. In addition, land use and zoning reforms may not
occur if the offending jurisdiction does not receive HUD funds.
However, states can mandate housing element content, as part
of their AFH because all consolidated plans must contain an
accepted AFH.
While some may question these positions, I would counter
that federal low-income housing expenditures undergo a
congressional scrutiny that may deliver conflicting results
(Heathcott 2012; Lang, Anacker, and Hornburg 2008; von
Hoffman 2012; Wolch 1998). The Hope VI program, for exam-
ple, exemplifies these conflicts: redevelopment of distressed
public housing, dispersal of households with vouchers, suspen-
sion of the one-to-one replacement of demolished units, and
implementation of the one-strike rule (Goetz and Chapple
2010; Hanlon 2012; Hellegers 1999; Johnson 2001). Under
regional initiatives, rotating municipal leadership governs
regional agencies under the aegis of cooperation (Lindstrom
2010; Vogel and Nezelkewicz 2002; Wheeler 2002). Under
cooperative paradigms, a redistributive decision (i.e., equitable
low-income housing distribution) may be just talk, since
regional agencies do not enjoy “the attributes of sover-
eignty—the power to tax, to regulate, and to condemn”
(Babcock 1972, 61; Innes and Gruber 2005; Mogulof 1971).
With stronger state enforcement, I argue that municipal hous-
ing elements are a viable method for increasing low-income
housing because municipalities are created and regulated by the
state (Briffault 1990; Burns and Gamm 1997). States grant
autonomy via home rule.5 States can restrict autonomy as home
rule foments dissent. Lastly, states can mandate statewide low-
income housing policy.
While many plans have facilitated low-income housing
(Meck, Retzlaff, and Schwab 2003), this review examines
housing elements because municipalities are ground zero for
housing production. At present, federal low-income housing
policy emphasizes renting via housing vouchers (demand side)
or tax credits (supply side) and operates at scales greater than
municipalities (Goetz 2012; Landis and McClure 2010).
Returning to HUD programs, both the Community Develop-
ment Block Grants (CDBG) and HOME Investment Partner-
ships Program (HOME) provide support for low-income
housing; however, they are not the focus of this article because
these programs as driven by population-based formulas rather
than local land-use decisions.6 What is needed, is a local mea-
sure that influences the local housing market.
In this case, the housing element satisfies four local condi-
tions. First, the municipal housing element articulates the
municipality’s multifamily housing policy to local developers.
Second, if states require vertical consistency between a long-
term general plan and the short-term zoning code, then housing
elements direct municipal housing implementation (Growth
Management Act [GMA] 1985; General Plan Guidelines
2003). Third, housing elements are a true measure of municipal
commitment to low-income housing because an element’s
goals, policies, and programs signal whether low-income hous-
ing implementation is supported with municipal revenue or
contingent and exogenous sources (Baer 1986; Basolo 1999a,
1999b; Nguyen, Basolo, and Tiwari 2013). Fourth, if states
embed HUD’s recent fair housing rule into the state’s housing
policy, then states can measure municipal housing elements
(and subsequent housing production) as meaningful actions
that overcome fair housing impediments.
To locate the pertinent research, I input multiple terms in
multiple combinations (e.g., housing element, regionalism,
affordable housing, low-income housing, and fair share) into
the Web of Science, Social Sciences Citation Index, and Goo-
gle Scholar databases. I also consulted Meck et al.’s regional
housing research (2003, appendix B). Even though the housing
element has existed since the mid- to late-1960s and nearly 50
percent of US states require this housing document, my litera-
ture search found that there is a dearth of empirical housing
element research. Many researchers have examined housing in
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin; however, that research
(and the numerous law reviews) examined other housing inter-
ventions. To determine whether municipal housing elements
have increased low-income housing production, this review
examines the housing element performances of California,
Florida, Illinois,7 and Minnesota. To date, these are the only
states with empirical housing element research.
Following this introduction, the review has three subsequent
parts. The second section chronicles the emergence of housing
elements as a federal intervention to mitigate housing discrim-
ination. This section also outlines my framework for strength-
ening state enforcement of housing elements. The third section
applies that framework to California, Florida, Illinois, and Min-
nesota by analyzing each state’s planning doctrine, housing
policy, and the pertinent empirical research. In the final sec-
tion, I discuss the commonalities of the empirical research and
propose a state plan for equitable housing production.
The Housing Element as a Government
Intervention
The housing element is one of many federal interventions
(zoning, planning, and home rule) in municipal autonomy. I
discuss these interventions in order to demonstrate how Con-
gress positioned the housing element as mitigation against
housing inequity. This background is important because Con-
gress set the precedent for intervening in municipal planning.
This section focuses on Section 701’s impact on planning and
housing. I close with considerations for transforming the fed-
eral Section 701 program to a state program to increase low-
income housing.
During the 1920s, the US Department of Commerce issued
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and the Standard State
City Planning Enabling Act. The former formalized zoning
while the latter fostered long-term planning by specifying mas-
ter plans—a precursor to the general plan (Hoover 1926; 1928).
As Secretary Hoover noted, these acts “endeavor to provide, so
far as it is practicable to foresee, that proper zoning can be
undertaken . . .without violating property rights” (1926, III).
Figure 1 charts the adoption of zoning in the United States
from 1904 to 1932. These federal acts also encouraged states
to devolve home rule authority to municipalities by cloaking
zoning within police powers (protection of health, safety, and
general welfare; Knauss 1930). After years of contention, Con-
gress passed the Housing Act of 1937. This act inaugurated
publicly funded housing but limited housing occupancy to
low-income households, prohibited aesthetic designs, and
required the demolition or rehabilitation of one slum unit for
every new public housing unit (von Hoffman 2005). Congress
adopted these limitations to ensure that public housing would
not compete with market-rate housing (Flanagan 1997).
During the post–World War II housing shortage, Congress
revised national housing priorities with the Housing Act of
1949, through which the Federal Housing Administration
increased suburban homeownership by “redlining” urban and
minority neighborhoods as unacceptable for mortgage insur-
ance (Quigley 2000). The act accelerated slum clearance with
urban renewal also known as “negro removal” because minor-
ity neighborhoods were often targeted as blighted (Arnstein
1969, 218; Massey and Denton 1993, 56). A municipality could
not receive federal slum clearance funds unless its urban
renewal plan conformed to the municipality’s general plan
(Housing Act of 1949, Title I, Section 105). Upon implemen-
tation, federal officials found that, for small localities (25,000
persons or less), the “housing and building codes were out-
moded and poorly administered,” with no local planning
mechanism to guarantee the federal urban renewal investment
(Feiss 1985, 179). In response, Congress added Section 701 to
the Housing Act of 1954 to authorize 50 percent matching
grants to states and municipalities for “planning assistance
(surveys, land use studies, urban renewal plans, technical ser-
vices and other planning work)” (Housing Act of 1954, 640).
By 1956, 242 small municipalities had received planning
grants from an initial appropriation of US$1 million (“Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Committee on Banking and Currency” 1968, 93).
During the 1960s, Congress expanded federal intervention
in municipal planning by amending Section 701 to support
comprehensive planning and increasing matching grants to
66 percent (Housing Act of 1961). By 1965, Section 701 sup-
ported plans for college housing, open space preservation,
sewer projects, mass transit, and regional planning (Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965). By 1967, 44 states, 27
councils of governments, and 6,200 small municipalities had
received Section 701 grants (“Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency” 1968, 93). In 1968, America’s social,
economic, and racial cleavages erupted (e.g., white flight, civil
unrest, and dislocation of minority residents; Pritchett 2008;
Rasmussen 2014). In response, Congress required that any
comprehensive plan funded by Section 701 must include a
housing element to address local and regional housing needs
(Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968). As an inter-
vention, the housing element represented a sea change for Sec-
tion 701 on two fronts: discrimination and direction.
Regarding discrimination, during the 1968 housing act hear-
ings, Governor Kerner, chairperson of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, testified that “freedom of resi-
dency and open occupancy is essential to solving” the over-
crowded central city conditions because suburban
municipalities “will not adopt ordinances to allow the Negroes
to live near their homes” (“Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking
and Currency” 1968, 356, 359). Likewise, Senator Paul
Douglas, chairperson of the National Commission on Urban
Problems,8 testified that “the suburbs must be opened up for
low-income housing. . . .This whole question of zoning is
rigged by the suburbs to keep out the poor and to keep out the
Negroes” (“Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and
Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency”
1968, 759–760). With regard to low-income housing produc-
tion, Edward Kaiser, chairperson of the President’s Committee
on Urban Housing, testified that “private developers who want
to build [low-income] housing for a profit can be stopped cold
by communities opposed to minorities moving into their
boundaries” (“Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing
and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency”
1968, 269). The testimony from the National Association of
Housing and Redevelopment Officials and the National Asso-
ciation of Home Builders also supported housing elements
(“Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency” 1968,
222, 319, 321). Lastly, the National Commission on Urban
Problems endorsed housing elements by reporting that “nearly
every major city already had a building code, but not more than
50 to 100 cities had housing codes” (Building the American
City 1968, 160, 173).
Regarding direction, although Section 701 existed for four-
teen years, “there were no requirements as to what grant reci-
pients must undertake” since grants could be applied to
planning surveys, comprehensive planning, transportation, or
other federal planning efforts (Wellborn 1976, 13). Thus, states
and municipalities not concerned with comprehensive planning
could apply Section 701 grants to any endeavor requiring a
plan.9 In the revised 1968 Housing Act, Congress positioned
the housing element as a funded planning mandate to require
municipalities to consider regional housing needs by increasing
local housing opportunities for low-income households. More-
over, these low-income housing opportunities were intended to
directly mitigate exclusionary municipal zoning and indirectly
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Figure 1. Zoned municipalities in the United States (1904–1932). Source: Knauss (1933, 6–7, table II).
mitigate inequitable federal housing policy (e.g., public hous-
ing restrictions, Federal Housing Administration insurance red-
lining, and urban renewal; Hillier 2003; Martinez 2000;
Meyerson and Banfield 1955; Teaford 2000).
As with any federal intervention, there were issues with
local implementation. In 1968, the federal Office of Manage-
ment Budget (OMB) recognized, through conflicting applica-
tions from multiple agencies, that there was no unified
mechanism for coordinating intergovernmental aid (Rothen-
berg 1983; Stam 1980). In response, in 1969 the OMB issued
the A-95 circular to require municipal applications for federal
funding to adhere to a regional “clearinghouse” review in order
to increase intergovernmental program consistency (Gordon
1974). Consequently, regional agencies employed the A-95
circular to restrict and/or withhold federal funds if a munici-
pality departed from regional priorities (Mogulof 1971). In
1974, Congress revised Section 701 to require that comprehen-
sive plans include a land-use element for guiding
“governmental policies . . .with respect to the pattern and
intensity of . . . residential, commercial, [and] industrial” devel-
opment (Housing and Community Development Act of 1974).
More importantly, HUD positioned the land-use element as a
safeguard against the adoption of national planning legislation
(“Land Use Bill Killed” 1975; Ash 1974, 56).10
By 1976, HUD’s A-95 regulations allowed Section 701
grants to support not only comprehensive planning but also the
planning required by CDBG, the Office of Coastal Manage-
ment, the Department of Interior, and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (701 Comprehensive Planning Assistance:
Statutes, Regulations, Interagency Agreements, Departmental
A-95 Implementing Instructions 1977). The expanded regula-
tions also allowed regional agencies to prepare areawide hous-
ing opportunity plans (AHOP) to implement fair-share housing
schemes (701 Comprehensive Planning Assistance: Statutes,
Regulations, Interagency Agreements, Departmental A-95
Implementing Instructions 1977, pp. 28–29). Fair-share distri-
butes low-income housing within a region in a manner that is
equitable to the recipient communities while providing the
potential housing occupants with geographic choice and
access to community amenities (Rubinowitz 1974 in Listokin
1976, 1). In 1976, the regional planning agencies in Albany,
Dayton, Denver, Hartford, Los Angeles, San Diego, and San
Francisco maintained fair-share housing schemes (Listokin
1976, 217–21).
While the Section 701 program raised awareness of plan-
ning by creating plans and planners, the program had detractors
(Brooks 1988; Feiss 1985). First, Section 701 was costly
(Figure 2 illustrates the annual appropriations) and its efficacy
was unproven. Due to the 1970s economic crisis and the
Vietnam War, in 1974 the OMB recommended Section 701
suspension because “after 20 years and $600 million in plan-
ning grants, there is little hard evidence of program benefit
(although ‘701’ [has kept] many planners and planning agen-
cies in business)” (Ash 1974, 49). Second, Section 701 lacked
focus. From 1969 to 1980, the Section 701/A-95 circular grew
from 50 to 240 federal programs (Steinman 1982). In a second
OMB evaluation, Staats (1977) noted that Section 701 planning
programs were haphazardly initiated to satisfy particular
demands, federal agencies ignored regional clearinghouses,
and states disregarded state planning agencies. Third, the Sec-
tion 701/A-95 clearinghouse review did not ensure equity.
Regional staff often lacked social e-service expertise because
the staff’s primary function was to service municipalities, “not
to administer the A-95” (Russo 1982, 55–56). Fourth, munici-
palities complained about “insufficient pre-application assis-
tance, unnecessarily complex contract arrangements,
[ . . . and] slow payment of funds” (Post 1974, 5). Fifth, regard-
ing housing element efficacy, HUD only required two para-
graphs for any Section 701 application. Thus, it was not clear
how HUD or any regional agency could evaluate a municipal-
ity’s mitigation of exclusionary zoning. Lastly, many critics
contended that “the reviewed [municipalities] can’t do the
reviewing” of applications because member municipalities lead
regional agencies (Mogulof 1971, 419).
In 1981, President Reagan slashed HUD’s budget authority
(terminating Section 701 grants) and issued Executive Order
12372 (rescinding the A-95 circular; Bratt and Keating 1993;
Graham 1985). Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the US
Department of Treasury terminated passive loss tax deduc-
tions (Guthrie and McQuarrie 2005). This termination
deterred private investment in multifamily construction—
units most likely to house low-income households due to
economies of scale (DeSantis 2002; Schwartz and Johnston
1983). For many municipalities, these federal actions exacer-
bated resistance to low-income housing because “only the
most expensive single-family homes yield[ed] sufficient rev-
enues to offset the service costs incurred from new residents”
(Goetz 1995; Myers 2002, 8).
In closing, the federal government not only formalized plan-
ning and zoning but also recognized that exclusionary munic-
ipal zoning would repel minority and/or low-income
households from the suburbs. In response, federally mandated
housing elements with state and regional review required muni-
cipalities to consider local and regional housing needs. With
the demise of the Section 701/A-95 circular, municipalities
now receive less federal pressure to accommodate low-
income housing needs. Even though HUD recently amended
its rule on the 1968 Fair Housing Act (US Department of
Housing and Urban Development 2015), the rule’s influence
on low-income housing production is to be determined. A key
component will be HUD’s evaluation of any recipient’s mean-
ingful actions that “overcome” the negative factors that affect
housing choice as well as the recipient’s discussion of local
knowledge. HUD defines local knowledge as “state and local
laws, regulations, and processes such as occupancy, land use,
and zoning codes . . . that is known or becomes known to the
program participant, and is necessary for the completion of the
AFH” (AFFH Rule Guidebook 2015, 49; US Department of
Housing and Urban Development 2015). Even though HUD
does not require an analysis of local knowledge, recipients
cannot ignore local knowledge either, especially if such knowl-
edge (i.e., land use, zoning) impedes fair housing choice.
At the state level, municipal planners must adhere to endur-
ing state mandates that require housing elements to accommo-
date low-income housing needs (Appendix Table A1). Thus,
what is the housing element’s current role? Is the housing
element just another “expensive and unused” plan (Feiss
1985, 175) or should states invigorate housing elements to
increase equity? This review argues that states should lead in
low-income housing production because states create munici-
palities and regulate municipal behavior. In addition, states are
the direct recipients of HUD funding and cannot ignore the
exclusionary zoning of municipalities if local regulations
impede fair housing. Thus, states can increase low-income
housing production by adhering to HUD’s new rule that
requires meaningful actions as well as by learning from Section
701’s missteps in governance, goals, compliance, forecasting,
density, penalties, and finance.
Regarding governance, congress conceived Section 701 as
planning assistance; however, the program’s function as a cash
transfer did not hold municipalities accountable to federal
aims. Section 701’s goal was plan creation, but goals must be
linked to qualitative or quantitative objectives that demonstrate
plan efficacy. In addition, the cumulative planning functions
added by Congress imbued Section 701 with mission creep.
Figure 3 illustrates that cities were second in grant awards but
no research connects cities with Section 701 program efficacy.
Regarding compliance, a plan’s compliance with any law
should evidence not just expended funds but also the measur-
able attainment of the plan’s objectives. To date, no evaluation
of Section 701 and housing or land-use elements exists.
Regarding forecasts, Section 701 supported regional fair-
share AHOPs to increase metropolitan housing equity. In a
seven-year period, HUD approved more than sixty AHOPs;
however, no agency can determine whether the forecasts were
accurate or regional fair share was met (Tutman 1981).
Any discussion of housing should also include a discussion
of density. While Section 701 housing elements must consider
regional housing needs, the attainment of regional housing
equity requires infringement on local prerogatives on density.
When faced with municipal barriers, regional agencies have
withheld transportation or infrastructure funds as a penalty;
however, a “built out” municipality may not desire federal
support. Regarding subsidies, Section 701 supported plans,
planners, and planning consultants attending to low-income
housing, but low-income housing require a consistent subsidy.
In the subsequent discussion of housing element research, I
intend to reference these issues.
A Review of Housing Element Research
California
Since its inception, California has granted home rule autonomy
to municipalities and currently allows them to incorporate
under hierarchal state law or under a charter that bestows broad
autonomy in reference to state planning law (Peppin 1941;
Walsh, Roberts, and Pellman 2005). Prior to the federal acts,
in 1917 California granted zoning authority to any incorporated
city or town (Chapter 734). In 1947, California required
municipalities to maintain a general plan (Conservation and
Planning Act 1947).
California’s Housing Element Law. In 1967, California passed the
housing element law in order to increase suburban housing
production by requiring general plans to include a housing
element that “endeavor[s] to make adequate provision for
all economic segments of a community’s housing needs”
(Housing Element Law 1967, chap. 1658; Baer 2008, 55).11
One of the law’s five goals declares, “Housing affordable to
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Figure 2. Annual appropriations for 701 comprehensive planning assistance, 1954–1981 (dollars in thousands). Source: Tutman (1981).
low- and moderate-income households requires the coopera-
tion of all levels of government” (Housing Element Law 1967,
Section 65580). During Governor Brown Jr.’s progressive first
term, California’s Department of Housing and Community
Development (CAHCD) initiated a fair-share scheme to stratify
housing needs by household income (i.e., very-low, 0–50 per-
cent of HUD’s area median income [AMI]; low, 51–80 percent;
and moderate, 81–120 percent; market-rate is greater than 121
percent). As a vertical consistency state, zoning codes must
implement a general plan’s housing element, which in turn
advances California’s goals for housing equity (Table 3).
California’s implementation. California implements the housing
element law in four general steps. First, CAHCD forecasts and
distributes housing needs to each regional Council of Govern-
ment (COG). Second, the COGs prepare multiyear fair-share
housing allocations, reflecting each municipality’s housing
needs and production capacity. Third, a municipality incorpo-
rates its allocation into its housing element to specify planning
actions that accommodate low-income and market-rate housing
during the document’s five- to eight-year effective period. To
facilitate low-income housing, California requires a housing
element to identify the quantity of constructed, rehabilitated,
and/or preserved units and guarantee that the municipality con-
tains enough appropriately zoned land to absorb constructed
units. The housing element must also list any planning tech-
nique that will increase low-income housing (i.e., annexing
vacant land, density bonuses, inclusionary zoning, residential
rehabilitation, sites of increased density, tax increment, and/or
mixed use). Lastly, a municipality submits its housing element
to CAHCD to determine whether the document’s goals, poli-
cies, programs, potential subsidies, proposed densities, and
identified sites comply with the law. Compliant municipali-
ties may compete for state and federal funds; noncompliant
municipalities risk lawsuits from private parties. If a lawsuit
prevails, then all permitting ceases until the housing element
is cured (Dodge, Shoemaker, and Stone 2002, 8). While
detailed, the law neither evaluates housing production nor
issues penalties, despite lobbying by housing advocates
(Housing Element Law 1967, Section 65585; Housing
Element Working Group 2004).
Annual compliance with the Housing Element Law has
been inconsistent because many municipalities view the law
as an intrusion on home rule (Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach
1997).12 During the 1990s, California’s compliance rate
climbed from 9 percent to 50 percent due to technical assis-
tance from CAHCD, leverage of federal funds (e.g., HOME
funds for construction, CDBG funds for rehabilitation, Sec-
tion 8 vouchers for preservation), and potential lawsuits from
the state’s attorney general. During the 2000s, California’s
compliance rate peaked at 90 percent in 2010, dropping to
45–60 percent after the housing crash. The initial 1967 law
contained two paragraphs; at present, the law spans over
forty-five pages. Lewis (2003) noted, “Highly detailed sta-
tutes are often evidence of widespread disagreement on a
given policy . . . In the case of [California’s Housing Element
Law], the result is an unwieldy law that is often difficult for
outside observers to comprehend in its entirety or details”
(p. xii). In response to the law’s complexity, municipalities
hire planning consultants for housing element creation.13
Evaluation of California’s Housing Element Law. In the 2000s,
Lewis examined the Housing Element Law to determine its
influence on housing. In 2003, he regressed the 1991 compli-
ance status of 202 municipalities on their 2000 Census housing
data and determined that compliance had no relationship to a
municipality’s change in total housing units or ratio of multi-
family units to total housing units. While he argued that
$346,106
$228,370
$199,721
$99,106 $88,592
$45,733
$1,695
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000
$350,000
$400,000
Metropolitan Areas Small Cies States Large Cies Non-Metropolitan
Areas
Other Counes
Figure 3. Total appropriations for 701 comprehensive planning assistance by recipient, 1954–1981 (dollars in thousands). Source: Tutman (1981).
compliance had no influence on housing, his analysis did evi-
dence that compliant municipalities produced more multifam-
ily units than noncompliant municipalities. In 2005, Lewis
regressed the 1994 compliance status of 354 municipalities
on their 1994–2000 residential permit data and determined that
housing unit age, population, household income, and job/
worker ratio, not compliance, influenced housing production.
While notable, Lewis’ work has limitations. First, Lewis relied
on census and permit data that did not identify low-income
housing units. Lewis also implemented a cross-sectional
research design to test a longitudinal phenomenon, as housing
elements are effective from five- to eight-years. Lastly, his
analysis may have been skewed due to low municipal rates
of compliance with California’s mandate.
Recently, Ramsey-Musolf (2016) used similar data sources
from a purposive14 sample of Los Angeles and Sacramento
region municipalities (n ¼ 53) to determine how low-income
housing production changed over time (1990–2007) and
whether compliance with the Housing Element Law influenced
low-income housing and annual housing production (2016).
Regarding compliance, the sample’s performance was 13.7
percent in 1990, 50 percent in 2000, and 75.3 percent in
2005, mirroring California’s performance. Regarding low-
income housing production, the sample produced 32 percent
of the 1990–1997 allocation and 42 percent of the 1998–2005
allocation. In contrast, the sample produced 78 percent and 160
percent of the respective market-rate housing allocations.
Regionally, the Sacramento subset of municipalities performed
better than the Los Angeles subset in terms of compliance
(58.7 percent vs. 35.7 percent), low-income housing production
(47.1 percent vs. 30.6 percent), market-rate housing produc-
tion (166 percent vs. 78.3 percent), and overall housing pro-
duction (97.6 percent vs. 49.6 percent). In short, suburban
municipalities with access to vacant land were more likely to
be compliant and produce surplus market-rate housing but
experience deficient low-income housing production.
While controlling for various municipal conditions,
Ramsey-Musolf determined that compliant municipalities were
associated with a 2.3 percent increase in low-income housing
production relative to noncompliant municipalities. In contrast,
compliant municipalities were associated with a .22 percent
decrease in overall housing production relative to noncompli-
ant municipalities. “Affordable housing advocates can argue
that compliance increases the low-income housing options in
compliant municipalities, while also counteracting municipal
resistance” (Ramsey-Musolf, 2016, 504). Alternatively, private
capital can argue that compliance reduces the overall housing
production in compliant municipalities, in contrast to the
state’s goals for housing equity for all incomes. While this
recent research suggests that California’s Housing Element
Law may operate with conflicting goals, the findings are lim-
ited to the purposive sample. Ramsey-Musolf omitted the San
Francisco region municipalities and did not randomly select
the examined urban, suburban, and rural municipalities. Nei-
ther Ramsey-Musolf nor Lewis could establish a counterfac-
tual because no pretest data exists and all municipalities
received the intervention (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell
2002). Thus, more research is required to confirm the law’s
relationship to housing.
In summary, California’s Housing Element law attends to
housing equity. This attentiveness is due to the law’s devolved
consensus because no single agency (e.g., CAHCD, COGs, and
municipalities) governs the law, no agency directs other parti-
cipants, and no agency issues penalties. Density foments
municipal resistance because the law’s fair-share goals require
a municipal response to forecasted low-income and market-rate
housing demand. Since CAHCD does not evaluate housing
production in relation to the forecasts, compliance does not
signal efficacy. Fiscally, municipalities may use federal funds
to support low-income housing (i.e., construction, rehabilita-
tion, and preservation); however, the municipalities and federal
agencies may double count these low-income housing units in
their respective reports.
Florida
Unlike many states that adopted the 1920s federal zoning acts,
Florida did not adopt statewide zoning until 1939 (Florida
State Zoning Enabling Act 1939).15 In 1968, Florida updated
its 1885 constitution and established municipal home rule
(Williams 1998). Even though 1968 federal housing policy
required housing elements, Florida did not require them until
the 1975 Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act
(LGCP) that required municipal comprehensive plans
(i.e., future land use, housing, and four other elements) and
consistency between the comprehensive plan and future devel-
opment. Under the LGCP, the housing element should address
blight, anticipate future housing, and identify future housing
sites. State and regional agencies could review draft compre-
hensive plans, but no revision was required. Strikingly, Florida
did not mandate comprehensive plan implementation. As a
result, “zoning continued . . . to drive the [comprehensive] plan
rather than the plan framing zoning, subdivision regulations
mechanisms” (DeGrove 1989, 34).
Florida’s GMA. During the 1980s, Governor Graham convened a
resource management task force that concluded that if Florida
was serious about growth, then Florida must create, fund, and
implement an integrated planning system (state, regional, and
local; DeGrove 1989, 35). In 1984–1985, Florida required the
governor to prepare a state comprehensive plan (Rhodes and
Apgar 1984) and revised comprehensive planning by passing
the GMA. The GMA heightened state authority over municipal
comprehensive plans by redefining consistency and adding the
concepts of concurrency and comprehension (GMA 1985).
Consistency now required comprehensive plans to adhere to
GMA as well as state and regional plans (Noll et al. 1997).
Concurrency required municipalities to demonstrate that
“adequate infrastructure and services be available concur-
rently with new development” and adopt an implementing
ordinance within one year of plan submission to the state
(Noll et al. 1997, 495). Comprehension required that a
comprehensive plan’s required elements articulate the muni-
cipality’s development vision.
Florida’s implementation. To facilitate low-income housing, Flor-
ida’s GMA required municipalities to integrate low-income
housing into their overall housing production. Florida’s
Department of Community Affairs (FLDCA) managed the
GMA and evaluated housing elements using a comprehensive
set of agency rules. In Florida, a housing element must inven-
tory municipal households (in comparison to the home
county), substandard units, rental units (subsidized and non-
subsidized), group homes, mobile home parks, and current
housing production. The housing element must analyze cur-
rent and future demand, land availability, private sector hous-
ing activity, and municipal incentives (i.e., streamlined
permitting, waived fees, federal, or state pass-through funds).
Finally, the housing element must identify sites and infra-
structure for low-income housing as well as the quantity of
rehabilitated and preserved units.
Unlike California, Florida enacted penalties. Under the
GMA, the FLDCA “may direct state agencies not to provide
funds to increase the capacity of roads, bridges, and water and
sewer systems in [non-compliant] local governments” (GMA
1985, Section 163.3134 (8)(a)). Plan updates (every five to
seven years) would allow FLDCA to continually influence
municipal planning (Frank 1985). In 1992, Florida adopted the
Sadowski Affordable Housing Act to subsidize low-income
housing construction, rehabilitation, and homeownership via
real estate stamp taxes. In 1993, Florida established uniform
methods for forecasting housing needs; however, Noll et al.
identified multiple constraints: FLDCA’s usage of existing and
free data; the municipal desire that “a single number designate
the housing need in a given year;” forecasts were not consis-
tently integrated in plans; and lastly, forecasts made no fair-
share attempt to distribute housing needs (Connerly and Smith
1996; Noll et al. 1997, 506).16
Evaluation of Florida’s GMA. By 1991, nearly 75 percent of Flor-
ida’s municipalities had adopted comprehensive plans with
attendant housing elements. In 1993, Connerly and Muller
evaluated “the potential and limits of state actions to stimulate
local planning responsibility for affordable housing” (p. 186).
The authors examined five municipal and five county housing
elements to determine whether a significant number of people
live in jurisdictions lacking “good housing plans” (p. 198).
Using a broad, seven-component rubric of planning and public
administration best practices, the authors gave the sample fail-
ing scores because the housing elements “lack[ed] the specifi-
city and comprehensiveness” to address Florida’s low-income
housing crisis (p. 196). While the GMA’s housing needs assess-
ment only required a housing affordability analysis and a lim-
ited structural deterioration analysis, the authors faulted the
sample for lacking any analysis of discrimination, neighbor-
hood revitalization, or estimates of homelessness (1993, tables
11.1–11.3). In addition, the authors faulted local governments
for not implementing allowable impact fees, tax increment
finance, or state tax credits as housing subsidies.
As an early plan quality evaluation, Connerly and Muller’s
study has limitations. First, the authors did not analyze the state
plan. Florida mandates vertical consistency between state,
regional, and municipal comprehensive plans, so it was unclear
whether deficiencies stemmed from a vague state plan or are
local failures. Second, the authors compared municipal and
county housing elements without recognizing that municipal
and county processes are nonequivalent (Lobao and Kraybill
2005). Lastly, Florida’s GMA takes a containment approach to
development, so it may be unrealistic to expect future low-
income housing production without specific planning policies
that address the political, fiscal, and technical aspects of
low-income housing production (Downs 2004; Levine 1999;
Scally 2013; Tighe 2012).
In 2014, Aurand examined the impact of housing element
low-income housing policies on housing affordability. He
determined that, on average, low-income policies increased
from three policies per housing element (1988–1993; Connerly
and Muller’s study period) to five policies per housing element
(1996–2004). Using ordinary least squares regression, Aurand
determined that 1988–1993 policies were not associated with
four measures of housing affordability, but the 1996–2004 pol-
icies were associated with decreases in homeowner cost burden
and increases in affordable housing inventory. Even though
Aurand found inconsistent associations, his analysis of low-
income housing policies suggests transactive planning—a
mutual and longitudinal learning process in which municipal
planners may have improved their housing policy implemen-
tation (Friedmann 1973). Alternatively, Florida’s enforcement,
funding, and (then) robust housing market may have also
improved low-income housing policy implementation (Aurand
2014, 15).
In summary, Florida employed a hierarchal scheme in which
the FLDCA, with regional inputs, determined housing element
compliance but did not evaluate housing production. Even
though Florida provides a low-income housing subsidy, Florida
raids the trust fund (“Stop Raids on Housing Trust Funds”
2015; Schweers 2016). In addition, Florida’s forecasts may not
reflect changes in immigration, account for development
cycles, or observe interactions between local and regional
housing markets. Finally, Florida eliminated the FLDCA and
rescinded many of FLDCA’s rules in 2011. Thus, the accom-
modation of low-income housing is locally determined using
various state housing programs but without state direction (e.g.,
no housing needs forecasts, no housing element updates, and no
compliance assessment).
Illinois
Despite the impact of Burnham’s 1909 Plan for Chicago, Illi-
nois planning law does not coalesce around a unified planning
doctrine.17 A key factor has been the fear of domination by
either Chicago or the state (Stroud 1943, 130). Between 1919
and 1921, Illinois adopted zoning, but master plans were not
required (Emmerson 1919, 278; 1921, 94). In 1961, Illinois
authorized voluntary comprehensive plans (Illinois Compiled
Statutes 1961). In the 1920s, the Illinois legislature first
debated home rule; however, municipal home rule was not
authorized until 1970 (Constitution of the State of Illinois
1970, Article VII, Section 6; Emmerson 1921, 306–308).
In 1999, the Illinois legislature’s urban revitalization commit-
tee concluded that small, fast-growing municipalities lacked
planning capacity. After three years of home rule debate
(“Regular Session House Transcripts” 2000, 50–69; “Regular
Session House Transcripts” 2001, 85-101), Illinois adopted the
2002 Local Planning Technical Assistance Act in order to
encourage, fund, and developmodel ordinances to promote com-
prehensive planning. The act operates as a planning assistance
grant by outlining plan elements (e.g., land use, housing, trans-
portation, and community facilities) but does not mandate con-
tent. Housing elements follow the federal model by documenting
local and regional housing needs and identifying barriers to
housing production; however, no implementation is required.
If a municipality does adopt a comprehensive plan funded by
this act, then the municipality must maintain consistency
between the adopted plan and any land-use regulations and/or
decisions for only five years after the plan’s adoption (Local
Planning Technical Assistance Act 2002, Section 30 (a)). In
2006, Chicago’s Metropolitan Mayors Caucus and Metropolitan
Planning Council advised municipalities to adopt comprehen-
sive plans for legal protection. “If, unfortunately, the jurisdiction
finds itself in court over land-use issues, having a comprehensive
plan that explains the community’s goals and future plans is an
excellent defense” (Meck and Retzlaff 2006, 2).
Illinois’ Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act (AHPAA). In
order to address low-income housing, in 2003 Illinois passed
the AHPAA. Proponents stressed that the AHPAA respected
home rule, affected a small number of communities, and
emphasized low-income housing planning (“Regular Session
Senate Transcripts” 2003, 68–78). In contrast, opposing legis-
lators objected to the act’s penalties. The AHPAA “encourages
counties and municipalities to incorporate” low-income hous-
ing into their housing inventory if the Illinois Housing Devel-
opment Authority (ILHDA) annually determines that 10
percent of municipal inventory is not affordable to low- and
moderate-income households (AHPAA 2004, Sections 10 and
20). Noncompliant municipalities must file an affordable hous-
ing plan with the ILHDA.
Illinois’ implementation. To facilitate low-income housing, Illi-
nois affordable housing plans must quantify the low-income
units required for 10 percent compliance, identify potential
construction sites, list any municipal incentives, and adopt one
of three inclusionary goals (AHPAA 2004, Section 25). The
inclusionary goals include 15 percent of new units as low
income, a 3 percent increase in the municipality’s overall
low-income housing inventory, or 10 percent of the municipal-
ity’s existing housing inventory. If ILHDA deems a plan com-
pliant, then the plan is effective until the next assessment of
municipal housing inventory. To counteract resistance, low-
income housing developers may appeal onerous approval con-
ditions or permit denials to the State Housing Appeals Board. A
municipality is protected from appeal only if it has filed an
affordable housing plan and can demonstrate that the plan’s
implementation has increased low-income housing inventory
(AHPAA 2004, Section 30(d)). In 2005, Illinois revised the
AHPAA to authorize municipal land trusts, trust funds, and
intergovernmental agreements to facilitate low-income hous-
ing; however, intergovernmental agencies cannot double count
low-income housing units.
Evaluation of Illinois’ Affordable Housing Plan and Appeal Act. In
2007, Hoch evaluated the AHPAA by asking: did this mandate
shift local policy attention to affordable housing; were the
mandate’s justifications perceived as legitimate; and were the
submitted affordable housing plans consistent, coherent, rele-
vant, and committed? Surveying municipal planners and
elected officials frommunicipalities that missed the act’s initial
deadline (n ¼ 49, 59 percent response rate), Hoch determined
that 51 percent of respondents agreed that the AHPAA focused
attention on affordable housing, 59 percent believed the
AHPAA imposed an unfair municipal burden, and 76 percent
believed the AHPAA made little economic sense. Regarding
the AHPAA’s goals to reduce the jobs/housing mismatch,
increase residential and economic diversity, and reduce traffic
congestion, 41 percent, 38 percent, and 28 percent of respon-
dents, respectively, agreed with those justifications. Using plan
quality methods on thirty-six plans, Hoch determined that 97
percent complied with the AHPAA, 47 percent discussed local
market conditions, and a scant 14 percent documented com-
mitments to low-income housing. Several municipalities dis-
puted the ILHDA assessment: “Home rule municipalities
claimed the law did not apply to them” (p. 93).
Hoch concluded, “despite skepticism and resentment, most
localities did prepare affordable housing plans . . . [and
focused] attention on the unpopular affordable housing issue”
(p. 96). He also believed that these “mediocre” plans would
neither alter perceptions nor guide planning practice (pp. 96,
98). However, did any of those mediocre plans increase low-
income housing production in the subsequent years? Unfortu-
nately, there are threats to the study’s validity and replication.
Hoch’s sample consisted of “noncompliant jurisdictions with-
out an adopted affordable housing plan” (p. 88); thus, these
municipalities may not represent the population, suggesting
selection bias. Regarding replication (and important to plan
quality evaluations), Hoch neither operationalized his concep-
tual model (i.e., consistent, coherent, relevant, and committed)
nor provided a protocol that guided his decisions (p. 89).
In summary, Illinois employs a hierarchal scheme in which
the ILHDAmanages the AHPAA by assessing affordable hous-
ing plans and low-income housing inventory (AHPAA: 2013
Non-exempt Local Government Handbook 2013). While the
AHPAA does not specify forecasts or densities, the law pro-
vides a simple metric for assessing low-income housing
(10 percent of housing inventory) and three inclusionary
housing goals for municipalities to adopt. Fiscally, Illinois
municipalities may create trusts for reducing costs. To counter
municipal resistance, an appeals board administers penalties;
however, the lingering issue of home rule persists. In 2013,
Illinois revised the AHPAA, potentially weakening its influ-
ence. First, the ILHDA will update assessments every five
years based on decennial census data. Second, the appeals
board members, appointed by the governor, no longer have
expiring terms.
Minnesota
In Minnesota, the state guards its sovereignty. In 1895, Min-
nesota allowed all municipalities to create home rule charters
as long as charters remained “in harmony with and subject to
the constitution” (Chapter 4 1895). In 1913, Minnesota granted
zoning authority to municipalities with populations greater
than 50,000 persons (Chapter 98 1913; Chapter 410 1913).
By 1929, Minnesota had expanded zoning authority to munici-
palities with populations greater than 10,000 persons or oper-
ating with a home rule charter (Chapter 176 1929). By 1933,
fourteen municipalities had adopted zoning, which covered
nearly 90 percent of Minnesota’s urban population (Knauss
1931, 26; 1933, 12, 35). Because no state agency had sufficient
territorial scope, Minnesota adopted several regional planning
laws to influence municipal development (Regional Planning
Act 1957; Regional Planning Board 1965; Regional Develop-
ment Act 1969). Under regional planning, the governor
appointed the executive director, the regional commission, and
any number of ex officio members.
To encourage local planning, in 1965 Minnesota adopted the
Municipal Planning Act to grant planning, zoning, and subdivi-
sion authority to municipalities; to allow planning departments
and advisory planning boards; and to authorize comprehensive
plans (Municipal Planning Act 1965, Section 2, sbd. 5). To
manage the seven-county Minneapolis and St. Paul region, in
1967 Minnesota established the Metropolitan Council (Council)
to coordinate planning and development. Subsequently, the
region’s municipalities were required not only to submit their
comprehensive plans to the Council but also any requests for
federal funds. In 1975, the Minnesota legislature allowed the
Council to suspend (up to twelve months) any comprehensive
plan that conflicted with Council priorities.
Minnesota’s Land Use and Planning Act (LUPA). In 1976, Minne-
sota passed the LUPA to require municipalities in the Twin
Cities region to adopt comprehensive plans (LUPA 1976).
Under LUPA, comprehensive plans must examine land use
(e.g., housing element), public facilities (e.g., transportation,
sewer, and open space), implementation (e.g., zoning, housing,
capital improvements), and, if applicable, urbanization. Urba-
nization plans specify the sequence of capital improvements for
new development. As a carrot, LUPA funded up to 75 percent
of a comprehensive plan’s cost (via Section 701 funds). As a
stick, no plan implementation could occur prior to Council
review, and the Council could sue municipalities with
comprehensive plans that departed from the Council’s priori-
ties. Within nine months of Council review, the municipality
must adopt the plan (effective until 1990, with subsequent five-
year updates) and maintain consistency between the plan, zon-
ing, and subdivision regulations.
Minnesota’s implementation. To address low-income housing
needs, the Council established a fifteen-member, modest-
cost housing advisory committee (consisting of elected offi-
cials, builders, consumers, and financial specialists) to
develop residential development standards. The committee
recommended that housing elements should “identify suffi-
cient land to accommodate the communities’ [fair-] share of
the region’s need for low- and moderate-income housing”
(Determining Affordable Housing Need in the Twin Cities
2011-2020 2006, 2). To facilitate low-income housing, Min-
nesota required municipalities to set aside high-density land
to directly allow multifamily housing and indirectly encour-
age low-income housing.
Evaluation of the Twin Cities’ LUPA. Citing that nearly 161,000
regional households were rent burdened or resided in substan-
dard housing, Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann evaluated
LUPA’s impact on low-income housing (2003, 214). The
authors asked, how did comprehensive plans facilitate
modest-cost housing, did planners and/or developers make suf-
ficient efforts to build low-income housing, and did municipa-
lities downzone land originally set aside for future low-income
housing? Of the region’s 144 municipalities, the authors exam-
ined housing elements from twenty-five suburban municipali-
ties that experienced high population growth and had access to
developable land. The authors determined that 1975–1990
housing elements facilitated low-income housing by imple-
menting at least four planning techniques: planned unit devel-
opments18 (PUDs, 75 percent), increased density (58 percent),
reduced unit sizes (58 percent), and tax increment subsides
(8 percent).19 From 1990 to 2003, housing elements employed
at least two planning techniques: PUD (59 percent), tax incre-
ment subsides (25 percent), increased density (19 percent), and
reduced unit sizes (12 percent).
According to the interviews (n ¼ 41), planners added acces-
sory dwellings, reduced lot sizes, zoning variances, and fee
waivers to the list of planning techniques. One planner sug-
gested that the weak relationship between the housing element
and low-income housing was due to politics: “Council mem-
bers that may have worked on these things are not necessarily
the same ones as we have today . . . [since] a housing plan
adopted in one year is not necessarily embraced by” a subse-
quent council (Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann 2003, 220).
When queried about planning techniques, another planner
responded, “I couldn’t have told you that was in the plan.
Sounds like one of those great consultant ideas” (Goetz, Chap-
ple, and Lukermann 2003, 220). Goetz et al. concluded that
planners “generally failed to take initiative in monitoring and
promoting . . . [low-income housing] through regulatory or polit-
ical means” (Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann 2003, 220). The
low-income housing developers identified land availability as
their primary obstacle to low-income housing production, fol-
lowed by neighborhood opposition, zoning regulations, and
municipal support. As a result, the developers would not “work
in communities where . . . [they were] not wanted” (Goetz, Chap-
ple, and Lukermann 2003, 221). In contrast to Goetz et al., the
developers valued planners’ efforts: “City staff ‘pushed on the
Met Council and lobbied the Minnesota Housing Finance
Agency for tax credit designation . . .MHFA tax credits was
critical . . . couldn’t have done it without them . . . ’ [while
another developer] credited city staff with trying to ‘help with
elected officials and countering neighborhood opposition’”
(Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann 2003, 221).
Regarding the availability of high-density land, Goetz et al.
examined roughly 7,460 parcels (8,590 acres), compared each
parcel’s 1980 and post-2000 land-use designation, and then
determined that only 22 percent of parcels remained high den-
sity. The municipalities downzoned 38 percent of high-density
parcels to low- or medium-density parcels, shifted 17 percent to
nonresidential uses, and converted 16 percent to PUD. The
authors conducted site visits, examined local rents, and then
estimated that for every 100 acres originally set aside for high-
density housing in 1980, roughly 5 acres may contain new low-
income housing (p. 223); however, this estimate cannot be
verified because no database links the original parcels with
low-income housing units.
While Goetz et al. provided a constructive methodology for
conducting regional housing element analysis and their sample
reflected cities with growing populations, some issues remain.
In 1995, the voluntary Livable Communities Act (LCA) sup-
plemented LUPA. The LCA required municipalities to provide
a one-to-one match for any Council funds designated for infill
development that prioritized rehabilitated, preserved, and
mixed-income housing. Therefore, municipalities may have
decided to pursue LCA rather than LUPA. In addition, the
authors did not consider the deeper impact of the Council ceas-
ing fair-share allocations (2003, 216). The cessation may have
allowed municipalities to operate without an external require-
ment for low-income housing and, thus, focus solely on their
own self-interest. Lastly, this twenty-five year evaluation
maintained clear bookends (1976 and 2001), but it, suffered
from periodicity, as the intervening years were unexamined.
Thus, we can only surmise the municipal decisions regarding
the downzoning of high-density land.
In summary, Minnesota’s LUPA advanced low-income
housing under a hierarchal scheme that permitted the Council
to direct municipal land use via planning grants, compliance
reviews, and lawsuits. Due to the absence of federal funds and
shifts in housing priorities,20 Council hierarchal command
shifted to governance (“a system of cooperation”), creating a
vacuum wherein municipal self-interest usurped regional needs
(Vogel and Nezelkewicz 2002, 108). For example, Goetz et al.
identified PUDs as the primary planning technique facilitating
low-income housing. When developed in the mid-1960s, PUDs
allowed “developers to mix land uses, housing types, and
densities” when development may have involved multiple
parcels with multiple participants (Meck 2002, 8–76). How-
ever, PUDs became “contract zoning” occurring between the
landowner and municipality at the exclusion of neighbors and
the region (Babcock 1966, 11). Thus, LUPA would facilitate
low-income housing if developers secured high-density land,
the PUD included low-income units, and the proposal received
municipal approval. In the period since Goetz et al.’s research,
Minnesota eliminated the modest-cost housing advisory
committee during a revision of the Council’s authority over
comprehensive planning (Metropolitan Land Planning Act
Modifications 2007).
Discussion
To support the argument that states should strengthen housing
elements to increase low-income housing production, this
review examined federal planning interventions, Section 701
planning grants and empirical housing element research.
Regarding federal interventions, Gordon’s (1974) federalism
typology provides a helpful lens (p. 47–49). Expansive feder-
alism (1920s–1930s) simultaneously constructed limited public
housing and encouraged states to allow municipalities to adopt
local planning policy. Cooperative federalism (1940s–1950s)
underwrote suburban homeownership, central city urban
renewal, and municipal planning assistance. Creative federal-
ism (1960s) recognized housing inequality by requiring muni-
cipalities to address exclusionary zoning via housing elements.
New federalism (1970s) shifted low-income housing responsi-
bility to states and regions (e.g., mandates, fair share, and
AHOP), municipalities (e.g., housing elements, block grants,
and housing assistance plans), and households (e.g., demand-
side housing vouchers). Devolution (1980s) signaled the retreat
of federal leadership and fiscal support. Currently, under neo-
liberalism (less government), no new federal expenditures for
low-income housing are foreseen, as the preferred tools are
vouchers and tax credits; however, HUD’s new rule on AFFH
holds promise.
To increase low-income housing, states should heed the
lessons of Section 701 by recognizing that a planning mandate
may only produce plans. However, low-income housing pro-
duction requires three factors: clear rules that are easily inter-
preted by developers, housing advocates, and planners (Bratt
2012; Knaap et al. 2007; Mitchell 2004; Talen and Knaap
2003; Veazey 2008); strong political will to place low-
income housing on the local/regional agenda (Basolo 1999b;
Landis and McClure 2010; Mallach 2009; Mueller and
Schwartz 2008; Mukhija et al. 2010; Scally 2013); and consis-
tent subsidies that allow low-income households to live without
financial hardship (Defilippis and Wyly 2008; Goetz 2002;
McClure 2004). Under Section 701, Congress fiscally sup-
ported the creation of municipal planning (clear rules). Con-
gress then required municipalities to create housing elements to
address local and regional housing needs (political will), but it
did not provide subsidies to support the planned low-income
housing. Concurrently, states enacted housing mandates to
focus municipal attention on low-income housing. However,
the examined research illustrates the uneven performance of
these mandates because states overemphasized compliance
with state laws rather than the production of low-income units.
California, the first state to mandate housing elements,
employs an elaborate fair-share scheme that stratifies housing
needs by income in order to create regional housing equity.
California scaffolds housing elements with vertical consistency
to ensure that daily municipal zoning implements long-term
state goals; however, California does not provide a consistent
subsidy and the Housing Element Law’s measurable outcome
is a plan not evidence of a constructed housing unit. Florida
was late to adopt zoning and comprehensive planning, but
GMA compensated by requiring municipalities to adhere to
state and regional priorities. In addition, Florida provides hous-
ing subsidies (i.e., carrots) and penalties (i.e., sticks); however,
its measurable outcome is a plan that addresses housing afford-
ability not housing production.
The Illinois AHPAA is exemplary in terms of legal clarity,
forecasts (10 percent of housing stock), trusts (i.e., carrots), and
penalties (i.e., sticks). However, home rule foments competing
visions of planning and housing. Again, Illinois’ measurable
outcome is a plan that is evaluated for compliance with
AHPAA. Minnesota implemented a regional fair-share scheme
that allowed its Metropolitan Council to impose authority over
municipalities. Under LUPA, municipalities were required to set
aside high-density land for future low-income housing produc-
tion. However, the cessation of Section 701 funded forecasts,
legislative tinkering reduced Council authority to governance,
and municipalities did not restrict high-density land for either
multifamily and/or low-income housing. Under LUPA as well as
the other examined states, Table 1 illustrates that the measurable
outcomes are plans not low-income housing units.
Despite these uneven performances, this article argues that
states should take the lead in providing low-income housing by
reforming state housing policy and home rule. Regarding
housing policy, a fair-share mandate would provide a floor
on which municipalities could build on, instead of fragmented
municipal prescriptions. States can design housing policies that
are germane to their social, economic, and cultural values and
recognize a state’s unique geographic features. Most impor-
tantly, the state’s housing policy should evaluate plans and
housing units. Regarding home rule, the constitution is silent
on municipal power. To that end, states grant municipalities
autonomy. Thus, any reduction of autonomy would serve to
reduce municipal resistance to housing equity. To be clear,
these state actions would be controversial.
Recently, California’s Governor Brown Jr. attempted to
revise the state’s housing development process by introducing
builder’s remedies, as supported by recent scholarship (Reid,
Galante, and Weinstein-Carnes 2016). If a housing project
contained a minimum proportion of low-income housing units
and a municipality denied the project, then the builder could
circumvent California’s environmental laws and secure a per-
mit from CAHCD. Unfortunately, the proposal neither
reformed the state’s housing mandate nor provided any fiscal
incentives but only antagonized labor, environmentalist,
housing activists, and municipalities (Dillon 2016). To gird
stronger state mandates for housing elements, states must
revise their state mandate and not rely on shortsighted mea-
sures. Due to HUD’s new fair housing rule, states have an
opportunity to commit to wholesale reform to the state’s hous-
ing policy because every consolidated plan requires an
accepted AFH. When creating the state-level AFH, states
must take into account local knowledge and data that identify
impediments (e.g., land use, zoning) to fair housing choices
(AFFH Rule Guidebook 2015, 49). Thus, states can no longer
ignore impotent state housing policy as well as exclusionary
municipal zoning.
To support the adoption of fair-share housing schemes,
states should also consider the recent US Supreme Court
Table 1. General Plan and Housing Element Conditions for California, Florida, Illinois, and Minnesota.
State
Zoning
Granted
to Cities?
General
Plan
Required?
General
Plan
Reviewed?
General
Plan
Update?
Housing
Element
Required?
Low-Income Housing
Needs Methodology?
Housing Element
Reviewed?
Housing Element
Update?
CA 1917 Yes No No Yes Housing needs
stratified by
household income
By state agency Every five to eight
years
FL 1920 by
individual
city, 1939
statewide
Yes Yes Every five
to seven
years
Yes Overburdened
renters and
homeowners
Indirectly by state
agency
With general plan
update
IL 1919–1921
statewide
No No No Suggested 10% of existing
housing inventory
Housing element, no;
affordable housing
plan by state agency
Housing element, no;
affordable housing
plan every five years
MN 1921 for large
cities, 1929
statewide
Yes Yes Yes Yes LUPA does not
calculate need.
LCA negotiates
with the city
Indirectly by state
agency
With general plan
update
Source: Chapter 734 (1917), Chapter 292 (1919), Chapter 217 (1921), Chapter 176 (1929), Florida State Zoning Enabling Act (1939), Conservation and Planning Act
(1947), Housing Element Law (1967), LUPA (1976), Growth Management Act (1985), Livable Communities Act (1995), General Plan Guidelines (2003), AHPAA
(2004), Emmerson (1919, 278; 1921, 94), and Wright (1952). LUPA ¼ Land Use and Planning Act; LCA ¼ Livable Communities Act.
decision on disparate impact. Disparate impact is a practice that
has discriminatory effect, which, predictably results in a neg-
ative impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, rein-
forces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin, even if the practice was not motivated by discriminatory
intent (“Title 24: Housing and Urban Development, Part 100:
Discriminatory Conduct under the Fair Housing Act” n.d.). In
2008, Inclusive Communities, Inc., charged that Texas’ method
for distributing low-income housing tax credits perpetuated
segregated housing patterns because Texas allocated “too
many tax credits . . . in predominantly black inner-city areas
and too few [credits] in predominantly white suburban neigh-
borhoods (“Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.” 2015, 1). In
2015, the court held that the disparate impact claim was cog-
nizable under the Fair Housing Act and directed Texas to elim-
inate the offending practice, rather than impose racial quotas.
While low-income households are not a protected class,
HUD clarifies that:
It is not HUD’s intent to use the AFFH rule to expand the charac-
teristics protected [by the Fair Housing Act . . .However, HUD
must] administer its housing and urban development programs –
that is, programs that target assistance to low-income persons—in
a manner to affirmatively further fair housing. Accordingly, it is
entirely consistent with the Fair Housing Act’s duty . . . to counter-
act past policies and decisions that account for today’s racially or
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty or housing cost burdens
and housing needs that are disproportionately high for certain
groups of persons based on characteristics protected by the Fair
Housing Act. Preparation of an AFH could be an important step in
reducing poverty among groups of persons who share characteris-
tics protected by the Fair Housing Act . . . . In addition, a large body
of research has consistently found that the problems associated
with segregation are greatly exacerbated when combined with con-
centrated poverty. (US Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment 2015, 43)
Thus, a state that adopts a fair-share scheme to reduce the
concentration of low-income households and increase the
households’ access to housing, employment, and educational
opportunities should be consistent with HUD’s implementation
of the Fair Housing Act.
While critics may contend that reliance on state housing
policies creates fifty visions for housing, all states currently
implement unique visions for education, health care, and
environmental law. Furthermore, housing policy that may
be successful in California may not be replicable in Florida,
Illinois, or Minnesota due to California’s values, geography,
and legislative framework. Uniqueness does not diminish the
potency of a state policy but may aid the policy’s adoption.
The challenge in strengthening low-income housing policy is
that any mandate will undergo scrutiny that will argue against
entitlements in favor of smaller government. However, the
need for low-income housing persists, as do state laws requir-
ing housing elements.
Theoretically, the best option for planners is an equitable
approach that implements fair-share housing production. Under
incrementalism, planners may fine-tune existing laws, but as
demonstrated by Section 701, fine-tuning may encourage mis-
sion creep. Collaborative paradigms hold promise, as this
approach brings different actors to the table; however, what
measure ensures that powerful actors remain voluntarily com-
mitted to unpopular initiatives? Reflecting Habermas, planners
can communicate issues (e.g., plans, meetings, and direct dia-
logue) in order to raise awareness and develop cohesive stra-
tegies. The nomenclature shift from subsidized to low-income,
to affordable, to workforce, and now to life cycle housing
evidences this approach (Goetz 2008). Unfortunately, commu-
nication alone may not ensure acceptance.
In the end, many states require both comprehensive plans
and housing elements; unfortunately, those housing elements
may not address low-income housing. However, a mandatory
fair-share approach may be equitable and successful, as it
would require municipalities to use their housing elements to
plan for low-income and market-rate housing production. This
approach would also require that states evaluate subsequent
housing production. To increase low-income housing inven-
tory, a state’s housing mandate must harness market-rate
housing to low-income housing production, as noted by HUD
(AFFH Rule Guidebook 2015, 124–25, 129–30). Planners
recognize that many communities desire quality housing since
many households engage with the private sector to secure
such housing. The private sector, in its pursuit of profit, will
always cater to market-rate demand. This approach, based on
inclusionary principles, would use private capital to correct a
market failure, rather than relying solely on a government
solution. The implementation of these principles will require
reforming state housing policy to ensure that households
from all incomes in a community have decent homes. Thus,
I suggest the following state reforms to increase low-income
housing production.
A Proposal for Reforming State Housing Policies
Goals. The Housing Act of 1937 called for eliminating unsafe
housing, eradicating slums, reducing unemployment, and
stimulating business activity. The Housing Act of 1949
called for a “decent home and suitable living environment
for every American family” (Housing Act of 1949). Califor-
nia recognizes that housing is a vital statewide goal and
enlists the participation of government and the private sec-
tor. California also declares that low-income housing
requires the cooperation of all levels of government. States
should declare that all governments have a responsibility to
use their vested powers to address the housing needs of all
economic segments. Unlike the 1937 Housing Act, the goal
of state housing policy should be equitable housing produc-
tion not job creation.
Governance. A single agency must govern state housing policy.
The empirical research suggests that every municipality must
have an adopted housing element or affordable housing plan.
Updates should occur every five years, with state and regional
agencies providing housing projections based on each munici-
pality’s general plan, zoning, and housing production capacity.
Updates should also occur by region so that state and regional
agencies can ascertain housing market performance. As in
California, Florida, and Illinois, state agencies should provide
annual reports on municipal compliance to the housing policy.
Lastly, state policies and procedures must be clearly written
and simple enough for senior and assistant planners to manage
housing element creation and revision.
Compliance. State agencies, with regional agency input, should
evaluate housing elements for compliance with state policy.
The definition of compliance must include an assessment of
the housing element and housing production. Before a state
agency approves a housing element for years six through ten,
the state agency should assess the municipality’s housing pro-
duction for years one through five. For municipalities with
deficient low-income housing production, their housing poli-
cies and programs should be modified to include multifamily
housing as a “by right” land use, as found in California (Hous-
ing Element Law 1967, Section 65589.4). Adherence to five-
year updates would allow other interested parties (e.g., other
agencies, housing advocates, and residents) to mitigate exclu-
sionary behavior. If a municipality wishes to be a region’s
favored quarter, then it must make and prevail in its argument
(Babcock 1966, 149).
Forecasting. Any forecast should be limited to no more than five
years and require municipalities to provide an annual assess-
ment of housing activity (e.g., construction, rehabilitation, pre-
servation, and demolition). Under California’s climate change
law, housing elements are now effective for eight years. This
time frame is too long, since forecasts and projections may lose
accuracy over extended periods (Myers 2002; Myers, Pitkin,
and Park 2002). In addition, the definition of low-income hous-
ing may need to shift, depending on the state’s housing prices.
In Illinois, low-income households earn 0–80 percent of
HUD’s AMI. In California, low-income households earn 0–
120 percent of HUD’s AMI.
Florida, California, and Illinois differ in their allocation
strategies. Florida specifies a quantity of cost-burdened owners
and renters. California’s multiyear allocations roughly specify
that 60 percent of new housing should be low income and 40
percent should be market rate. Illinois specifies that of 10 per-
cent of municipal housing inventory must be low income. Of
these approaches, Illinois’ metric is the easiest for politicians
and advocates to understand and for planners and builders to
implement. However, few studies have evaluated housing allo-
cations and housing units due to a lack of accurate housing
data.
Penalties. To encourage municipal participation, laws must con-
tain both carrots (i.e., funding, technical assistance) and sticks
(i.e., penalties). A penalty also means that a state agency has
decided on an acceptable metric for determining program suc-
cess (e.g., greater than 50 percent, 75 percent, or 90 percent of
the housing forecast or allocation). Florida may withhold funds
for capital projects, revenue sharing, and/or CDBG. In Illinois,
developers denied a permit might appeal to a housing court. In
California, the state takes a lawsuit approach in which a low-
income householder must prove that he or she is negatively
impacted by municipality’s housing policies. Another option is
that states could suspend the issuance of building permits in
noncompliant municipalities. Under permit suspension, a muni-
cipality’s financial, insurance, and real estate actors would create
pressure for corrective municipal action. This author also pro-
poses suspension of property and sales taxes disbursement until
demonstrations of progress on low-income housing production.
Density. For municipalities located in urban, suburban, and rural
locations, states must establish a minimum overall density for
these jurisdictions. These defaults can ensure that municipali-
ties allow a mix of housing choices. California, Illinois, and
Minnesota require municipalities to identify sites/densities for
future low-income housing. California also designates default
densities that reflect each municipality’s spatial location (e.g.,
urban—thirty dwelling units per acre, suburban—twenty
dwelling units per acre, or rural—ten dwelling units per acre)
if a municipality forgoes a sites/density analysis. To ensure that
future density is consistent with an adopted general plan, each
state should require horizontal consistency between the general
plan’s land use and housing elements and vertical consistency
between the general plan and zoning code.
A planning technique that increases density is the density
bonus, which allows developers to increase the density of any
housing project when the project includes units set aside for
low-income housing (10–20 percent). Fiscally, the bonus units
should provide an internal cross-subsidy to finance low-income
housing units. In 1979 and 2006, California and Florida,
respectively, adopted bonus density laws. This planning tech-
nique is “politically appealing because it requires no financial
subsidies from local or state governments and allows private
developers to act in their own self-interest” (Johnston et al.
1989, 49).
Finance. While states cannot print money, they can adopt link-
age fees to subsidize low-income housing. Florida supports an
affordable housing trust fund with real estate stamp taxes. Cur-
rently, Illinois and California allow municipalities to adopt
inclusionary housing programs; however, states could adopt a
statewide mandatory inclusionary housing program to increase
and finance low-income housing production (built on-site, off-
site, or developers pay an in-lieu fee; Wheaton 2008). A state-
wide program would reduce the fragmented implementation of
municipal inclusionary housing (Calavita and Grimes 1998;
Schwartz and Johnston 1983). States would set a regional
in-lieu fee (i.e., impact fee or growth share) and program
implementation would move with the market (Burge and Ihlan-
feldt 2006; Mitchell 2004). In-lieu fees, collected as onetime
funds, would subsidize new and/or rehabilitate low-income
housing (Mukhija et al. 2010; Schuetz, Meltzer, and Been
2009). Any housing unit touched by such funds should be
affordable for thirty to forty-five years; if sold or refinanced,
then the state should reset the program clock. In addition, the
state or any nonprofit should have the first right of purchase,
with covenants regarding the rate of appreciation. Preservation
of existing units should involve federal sources (pass-through
funds from public housing authorities; Kleit and Page 2008).
Conclusion
In 1967, Congress created the housing element to address hous-
ing equity. This literature review found uneven performances
of housing elements in California, Florida, Illinois, and Min-
nesota because these states mandated the planning process but
did not evaluate subsequent housing production or provide a
consistent subsidy. To increase low-income housing produc-
tion, this review argues that states can counteract “home rule”
resistance in the absence of consistent federal funding. This
article outlines reforms (process and outcome) so that states
can usher in equitable production of low-income and market-
rate housing. In truth, passage of any state low-income housing
law will not be easy. However, evidence (e.g., federalism, Sec-
tion 701 planning grants, and scant housing element research)
suggests that planners must do more than attend to and plan for
low-income housing needs.
Appendix
Table A1. Comprehensive Planning and Housing Element Requirements by State.
State Statute
Comprehensive
Plan Required?a
Housing Element
Required?
AL Alabama Code, Title 11, Chapter 52, Section 8 Yes No
AK Alaska Statutes, Title 29, Chapter 40, Section 30 Yes No
AZ Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 9, Chapter 4, Section 461.05 Yes Yes
AR Arkansas Code, Title 14, Chapter 56, Sub Chapter 414 No No
CA California Government Code, Section 65300 Yes Yes
CO Colorado Revised Statutes, Title 31, Article 23, Section 206 Semib No
CT General Statutes of Connecticut, Title 8, Chapter 169c No No
DE Delaware Code, Title 22, Chapter 7, Section 702 Yes No
FL Florida Statutes, Title 11, Chapter 163, Section 3167 Yes Yes
GA Georgia Code, Title 36, Chapter 70; Georgia Rules and Regulations, Department 110,
Section 12-1
Semi Yes
HI Hawaii Revised Statutes, Title 13, Chapter 226 County only No
ID Idaho Statutes, Title 67, Chapter 65, Section 6508 Yes Yes
IL Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 65, Section 5, Article 11, Division 12 No No
IN Indiana Code, Title 36, Article 7, Chapter 4, Sections 205 and 503 Yes No
IA Iowa Code, Title 9, Chapter 414, Section 3; Iowa Code, Title 1, Chapter 18b Yes No
KS Kansas Statutes, Chapter 12, Article 7, Section 43 No No
KY Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 100, Sections 183 and 187 Semi Optional
LA Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 33, Sections 106 - 108 Semi No
ME Maine Revised Statutes, Title 30-A, Chapter 187, Section 4323 Semi No
MD Code of Maryland (Statutes), Land Use (GLU) §3-201 Yes Optional
MA Massachusetts General Laws, Part 1, Title 7, Chapter 41, Section 81D Yes Yes
MI Michigan Statutes, Chapter 125, Section 3801 Semi No
MN Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 473, Sections 858 and 859 Yes Yes
MS Mississippi Statutes, Title 17, Chapter 1, Sections 1 and 11 Yes Optional
MO Missouri Revised Statutes, Title VII, Chapter 89, Section 340 Yes No
MT Montana Code Annotated, Title 76, Chapter 1, Part 600 Yes Yes
NE Nebraska Revised Statutes, Chapter 15, Section 1102 Yes No
NV Nevada Revised Statutes, Title 21, Chapter 278, Section 150 Yes Yes
NH New Hampshire Revised Statutes, Title 64, Chapter 674, Section 2 Yes Yes
NJ New Jersey Statutes, Title 40, Chapter 55D, Section 38 Yes Yes
NM New Mexico Statutes, Chapter 3, Article 19, Section 9 Yes No
NY New York Statutes Town Law, Article 16, Section 272a; New York Statutes General Municipal
Law, Article 12-B 239-b (county), 239-i (regional); New York Statutes General City Law, Article
3, Section 28-A
No No
NC North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 160A-383 (zoning), Chapter 113A-102 (coastal) Semi Yes (county level)
ND North Dakota Century Code, Title 40, Chapter 48, Section 2 No No
(continued)
Table A1. (continued)
State Statute
Comprehensive
Plan Required?a
Housing Element
Required?
OH Ohio Revised Codes, Title 7, Section 713.01 Semi No
OK Oklahoma Statutes, Title 11, Chapter 45, Section 103 Semi No
OR Oregon Revised Statutes, Chapter 197, Section 175 Yes Yes
PA Act No. 247 of 1968, Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Section 301 County only Yes
RI Rhode Island Statutes, Title 45, Chapter 22, Section 2 Yes Yes
SC South Carolina, Title 6, Chapter 29, Section 510 Yes Yes
SD South Dakota Statutes, Title 11, Chapter 4, Section 3; South Dakota Statutes, Title 11, Chapter 6,
Section 2
Yes No
TN Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 13, Chapter 3, Section 301 (regional); Tennessee Code
Annotated, Title 13, Chapter 4, Section 201 (municipal)
Yes No
TX Texas Statutes, Local Government Code, Title 7, Chapter 213, Section 2 No No
UT Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 9a, Part 4, Sections 401–403 Yes Yes
VT Vermont Statutes, Title 24, Chapter 117, Sections 4381–4832 No Yes
VA Code of Virginia, Title 15.2, Chapter 22, Section 2203 Yes Yes
WA Revised Code of Washington, Title 36, Chapter 36, Section 70A (growth management plan);
Revised Code of Washington, Title 35A, Chapter 35A, Section 63 (comprehensive plan-city);
Revised Code of Washington, Title 36, Chapter 36, Section 70 (comprehensive plan-county)
Semi Comp plan—yes;
growth plan—no
WV West Virginia Code, Chapter 8A, Article 3 Semi Yes
WI Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 66, Section 1001 Semi Yes
WY Wyoming Statutes, Title 15, Chapter 1, Article 5, Sections 501 and 503 Semi No
Note: In 2002, Meck edited the American Planning Association’s report on implementing smart growth. This table updates Meck’s research because many states
have revised their planning statutes. Source: Meck (2002, table 7-5; permission pending).
aComprehensive, general, or master plan.
bSemi, means that a plan is which conditionally required if the municipality intends to implement zoning or maintains a planning commission.
Table A2. Total Cumulative Appropriations for 701 Comprehensive Planning Assistance by Recipient, 1954–1979.
Rank State or Territory Amount
1 California 69,995,135
2 New York 65,718,450
3 Texas 48,151,561
4 Pennsylvania 44,031,129
5 Ohio 40,678,587
6 Illinois 37,401,430
7 Michigan 35,945,705
8 Florida 29,453,653
9 Massachusetts 28,306,845
10 North Carolina 24,362,447
11 Georgia 23,538,228
12 Missouri 23,102,966
13 New Jersey 21,820,144
14 Wisconsin 20,517,762
15 Maryland 19,540,448
16 Tennessee 19,523,494
17 Minnesota 19,338,889
18 Alabama 18,673,861
19 Washington 18,354,576
20 Kentucky 17,985,337
21 Indiana 17,412,781
22 Connecticut 17,121,344
23 Louisiana 16,379,585
24 Virginia 16,025,749
25 Oregon 15,782,544
26 Colorado 15,366,525
27 Oklahoma 14,996,417
(continued)
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Notes
1. Overcrowding means that there is more than one person per bed-
room. This concept originated in the federal Housing Act of 1937,
which emphasized housing construction (Schwartz 2010).
2. As defined by Lowry and Grigsby, “filtering” is an economic pro-
cess whereby low-income households satisfy their housing needs
by residing in older and sometimes deteriorating residences “as a
result of decline in market price, i.e. in sales price or rent value”
(Grigsby 1963; Lowry 1960, 362). This process also requires two
concurrent conditions: (1) upwardly mobile households are moving
and (2) a housing supply that exceeds housing demand (Collins,
Crowe, and Carliner 2002, 175–77).
3. The US Census Bureau defines a “subfamily” as a family with or
without children that resides in a household in which the head of
Table A2. (continued)
Rank State or Territory Amount
28 South Carolina 14,341,141
29 Arkansas 13,144,590
30 Mississippi 12,865,500
31 Iowa 12,673,858
32 District of Columbia 12,081,828
33 Puerto Rico 10,866,324
34 Kansas 10,674,583
35 West Virginia 9,358,023
36 Arizona 9,077,201
37 New Mexico 8,547,331
38 Nebraska 7,582,917
39 Utah 6,948,516
40 Montana 6,857,809
41 Maine 6,302,268
42 South Dakota 5,759,121
43 Alaska 5,568,677
44 Rhode Island 5,524,534
45 Idaho 5,095,109
46 Vermont 5,048,154
47 New Hampshire 4,964,535
48 Hawaii 4,670,860
49 Delaware 4,048,951
50 North Dakota 3,980,384
51 Nevada 3,111,868
52 Wyoming 2,315,899
53 Virgin Islands 1,287,081
54 Guam 441,490
55 Samoa 386,195
56 Pacific Trust 223,380
57 Northern Mariana 80,000
Subtotal 933,353,719
Studies, research, and demonstrations 16,898,309
Urban systems engineering 5,060,593
Subtotal 21,958,902
Grand total 955,312,621
Source: Cumulative Net Grant Reservations by State (1979).
household, who maintains the residence, is not a member of the
subfamily. An example may include a residence in which the par-
ents and the grandparents share the same residence or the parents
and an adult child’s family share the same residence (Fields 2003).
4. US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
requires that program participants conduct an assessment of fair
housing if the participant receives Community Development Block
Grants (CDBG), HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME),
Emergency Solutions Grants, and/or Housing Opportunities for
Persons with AIDS funds. Categorically, participants are states,
insular areas (i.e., American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana
Islands, and the US Virgin Islands), public housing authorities, and
local government units.
5. Home rule is the transfer of authority from the state that allows a
municipality to select officers, determine its organizational struc-
ture, and regulate local matters of politics, culture, and economics
(Barron 2003; Briffault 1990).
6. For more information on HUD’s CDBG program, please see Hous-
ing Policy Debate’s special issue: CDBG at 40: Its Record and
Potential (Volume 24, Issue 1). For more information on the
HUD’s HOME program, please see Mickelson (2015).
7. The 2004 Illinois Affordable Housing and Planning Assistant Act
mandates that municipalities create an affordable housing plan not
a housing element. This review examines Illinois because the law
operates similarly to the California, Florida, and Minnesota
mandates.
8. One prominent member of the commission was Dr. Anthony
Downs, author of Opening up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for
America (1973).
9. In 1965, fifty-five states and territories received roughly US$188
million in planning grants. By 1979, the receipts for planning
assistance had increased to roughly US$956 million as indicated
in Appendix Table A2.
10. In the early 1970s, there were multiple efforts to revise planning
on a scale similar to the Department of Commerce Zoning
Enabling Acts. From 1963 to 1975, the American Law Institute
formulated the Model Land Development Code as a primer for
enabling state-level reviews of projects (private and public sector)
that may have had regional impacts due to location, land use, or
magnitude and that required municipalities to address low-income
housing needs when approving projects that may create 100 or
more permanent positions (Babcock 1972; Bosselman, Raymond,
and Persico 1976). In 1973, Representative Udall’s National Land
Use Act (HR10294) would have authorized the Department of
Interior to establish an environmentally directed comprehensive
planning program that would encourage states to create a state-
wide comprehensive plan that would require consistency between
a state plan and future development. While Udall’s effort died in
Congress, the former can be seen in Florida’s early planning laws
(The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act
1972; Local Government Comprehensive Planning 1975).
11. The director and commission chair of California’s Housing and
Community Development testified in support of the Housing and
Development Act of 1968 (“Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking and
Currency,” 728).
12. The California’s Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment (CAHCD) provides annual compliance reports to the
legislature (n.d.)
13. To identify low-income housing production for his sample of 53
municipalities, Ramsey-Musolf examined 138 housing elements
(2016). Of those documents, private planning firms created 80
(or 58 percent) housing elements.
14. To determine whether the Housing Element Law had any statis-
tical relationship to housing production, the sample reflected the
following conditions: municipalities (not counties), regional gov-
ernance (CAHCD, Council of Governments, and municipalities),
central cities/noncentral cities, and the annual compliance assess-
ment (no San Diego region municipalities).
15. In Florida, municipal zoning required special approval from the
legislature (e.g., Miami Beach in 1923, Coral Gables in 1925,
Orlando in 1923, and Tampa in 1933), and any attempt to zone
or adopt comprehensive regulations without such special author-
ization was void (Wright 1952, 327).
16. The University of Florida’s Shimberg Center for Housing Studies
provides forecast data.
17. The following Illinois planning laws differently define compre-
hensive planning: Local Resources Management Planning Act of
2002, Local Planning Technical Assistance Act of 2002, Local
Legacy Act of 2004, and the Chapter 65, ILCS 5/11-12-7.
18. A planned unit development (PUD) allows future development
to deviate from the proscribed zoning regulations. In the 1960s,
PUDs were hailed as flexible zoning tools for municipalities to
use in regulating complex projects; however, they were fre-
quently transformed into negotiated contracts between develo-
pers and elected officials without the input of residents (Babcock
1966, 11).
19. Under the Housing Act of 1949, municipalities could activate
redevelopment agencies in order to improve blighted areas. A
redevelopment agency may sell bonds to pay for land purchases,
infrastructure, and/or construction. Once completed, the redeve-
lopment project will generate property tax revenue. This reve-
nue, the tax increment, is spent on bond repayments and other
redevelopment activities (e.g., affordable housing, administra-
tion, and maintenance).
20. In 1994, Minnesota passed the Livable Communities Act (LCA)
which funded compact infill development while prioritizing hous-
ing rehabilitation and preservation as well as mixed-income
development. As a voluntary program, the LCA required that
municipalities provide a one-to-one match for any council funds
designated for low-income housing.
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